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ARTICLES
CONFESSIONS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
REHNQUIST COURT*
Yale Kamisar t
I. POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
About the time William Rehnquist ascended to the Chief Justiceship of the
United States, two events occurred that increased the likelihood that Miranda would
enjoy a long life.
In Moran v. Burbine,' a 6-3 majority held that a confession preceded by an
otherwise valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights should not be excluded either
(a) because the police misled an inquiring attorney when they told her they were not
going to question the suspect she called about or (b) because the police failed to
inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him.
Although Burbine has been criticized by a number of commentators,2 I think it
is a plausible and defensible reading of Miranda. I find it hard to believe that the
* Copyright © TEREHNQtusr CouRT. FARWEaIOTHE OLD ORDERIN IiECouR'. (Martin H. Belsky, ed.
Oxford University Press, 1999 forthcoming). This article is a revised and expanded version of a presentation delivered
at the Rehnquist Court Conference at the University of Tulsa College of Law on Sept. 16, 1998.
i Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
2. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 CoLuM.L.REv. 1227,1267-68 (1988); Paul
M. Moretti, Comment, Moran v. Burbine: Duty to Inform, Police Deception and the Egregious Standard for
Miranda, 23 NEwENG. L.REv. 151 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARv.L.REv.
125 (1986).
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Miranda Court would consider the now-familiar warnings inadequate when-even
though a suspect has been warned of his Miranda rights and has effectively waived
them-a lawyer whose services he has never requested and whose existence he is
unaware of has contacted the police on his behalf.
4
Whether or not I am right, more important than Burbine's specific holding, I
think, is the way the Court that decided Burbine looked back at and characterized
Miranda. Justice O'Connor spoke for six Justices (including Chief Justice Burger
and soon-to-be Chief Justice Rehnquist) when she told us that Miranda "as written"
struck "the proper balance" between law enforcement interests and a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights.
5
Unlike most critics of the landmark case, the Burbine Court viewed Miranda
as a case that "embodies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the
defendant's and society's interests."6 The Burbine Court also reminded us that
Miranda had rejected "the more extreme position" advocated by the ACLU that
nothing less than "the actual presence of a lawyer" (as opposed merely to police
warnings to a suspect about his rights) is needed to dispel the coercion inherent in
custodial interrogation.' Instead, the Miranda Court had concluded, to quote the
Burbine Court again, that "the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately
protected by less intrusive means."8
Up to this point, neither Justice O'Connor nor any of the Justices who joined her
opinion in the Burbine case could be called friends or admirers of Miranda.
Nevertheless, what they had to say about Miranda was what most of Miranda's
supporters had been saying about the case for the previous twenty years.
There is another noteworthy event that, I believe, provides a useful background
for the Rehnquist Court's treatment of Miranda. This event started out quite
ominously for the famous case, but ultimately turned out well.
Some four months after Justice Rehnquist had become Chief Justice, a division
of the Department of Justice released a 120-page report endorsed by Attorney
General Edwin Meese Ill, a report that sharply attacked Miranda as an illegitimate
decision.9 Shortly thereafter, "Meese's minions," as then Solicitor General Charles
3. To say that Miranda as originally written does not require the result sought by the defendant in Burbine is not
to deny that it may be forcefully argued that a rule complementing the Miranda doctrine should bar the admissibility
of a confession obtained in Burbine-like circumstances.
4. A footnote in the Miranda opinion, see 384 U.S. at 465 n.35, does seem to say that preventing an attorney from
consulting with his client would constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but at this point the
Miranda Court isdiscussingEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), a case where the suspect had repeatedly asked
to speak to his lawyer. See id. at 479-8 1. Moreover, Mr. Escobedo was aware of the fact that his lawyer was trying
to talk to him and that the police were preventing him from doing so. See id. at 480-81. This realization may well have
underscored the police domination of the situation and undermined Escobedo's resolve.
5. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 424; see id. at 433 n.4 (emphasis in the original).
6. Id. at 433 n.4 (emphasis in the original).
7. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. See OIcEoFLEALPoucy, U.S. DEP'TOFJUsniiM REPoRTToTHEAT RNEYGENERALON THELAw oFPRe-
TRIALINTERROGAmON (Feb. 12,1986, with addendum of Jan. 20, 1987), reprinted in 22 U. MicH. J.L. REPoRM 437
(1989). Although the Report was written in February of 1986, it contains an addendum written in January of 1987 and
was not released to the public until that month. Although the Report states that it does not represent the view of any
[Vol. 34:465
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Fried called them, took up the cry and "proclaimed it a Department objective to get
the Supreme Court to overrule Miranda."'1
As Professor Stephen Schulhofer notes, the Meese-endorsed report on the law
of pre-trial interrogation "triggered a spate of new articles confirming support for
Miranda in the law enforcement community."" As for Attorney General Meese's
campaign inside the Department of Justice against Miranda, Solicitor General (now
Harvard law professor) Fried resisted on various grounds. For one thing, "not a
single Justice had indicated any interest in overruling Miranda, while the substantive
law [confining the Miranda rule] was getting better and better."' 2 Moreover, Fried's
impression was that "most professional law enforcement organizations had learned
to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the extent that it provided them with a
safe harbor."' 3
After considering Solicitor General Fried's objections, the Attorney General
backed off. For the rest of Fried's time in office, "the Miranda issue was laid to
rest."'" I think it no exaggeration to say that the time to overrule Miranda had come
and gone.
A. Miranda: Its Bases and Its Legitimacy
Have I spoken too quickly? What about the fact that starting with Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Michigan v. Tucker,5 the post-Warren Court
has repeatedly distinguished between actual coercion by physical violence or threats
of violence and inherent or irrebutablypresumed coercion (the basis for theMiranda
rules)? The post-Warren Court has also drawn a line between statements that are
actually "coerced" or "compelled" and those obtained merely in violation of
Miranda's "procedural safeguards" or "prophylactic rules."' 6
Thus, although a statement found to be "involuntary" under pre-Miranda
standards is inadmissible for any purpose, a statement obtained in violation of
Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony if he subsequently takes
the stand in his own defense.' 7 Because a police officer may find the distinction
somewhat mystifying, one witty commentator has suggested that the author of a
police training manual might explain the situation as follows: "The Supreme Court
has said that pre-Miranda voluntariness standards are part of the 'real' Constitution.
division ofJustice other than the Office of Legal Policy, the release oftheReport was accompanied by an announcement
that the Attorney General had endorsed it. See StephenJ. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54U.CHI.L.REv. 435,
435 n.2 (1987).
10. CHARLEs FRED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUINGTHEREAGAN REVOLUrION-A FmiAND ACCOUNT 46 (1991).
11. Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 456 n.53.
12. FRMD, supra note 10, at 47.
13. Id. at45; see also SPECIALCO M-ONCR INALJUSnCEINAFREESocmrYCRMNALSECTONABACRDMINAL
JUSnCE IN CRisis 28-29 (1988). "A very strong majority of those surveyed-prosecutors, judges, and police
officers-agree that compliance with Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforcement" Id.
14. FRIED, supra note 10, at 47.
15. 417 U.S. 433 (1974); see infra text accompanying notes 25-28.
16. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
17. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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Miranda is part of the Court's 'just pretend' Constitution."'"
Ironically, the language in theMiranda opinion that the post-Warren Court used
in Tucker and other cases to deconstitutionalize Miranda is language Chief Justice
Warren inserted at the suggestion of Justice Brennan. Commenting on an early draft
of the Miranda opinion, Justice Brennan wrote Warren:
[We are justified in policing interrogation practices only to the extent required to
prevent denial of the right against compelled self-incrimination as we defined that
right in Malloy [v. Hogan]. I therefore do not think, as your draft seems to
suggest, that there is only a single constitutional solution to the problems of
testimonial compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. I agree that, largely for
the reasons you have stated, all four cases must be reversed for lack of any
safeguards against denial of the right. I also agree that warnings and the help of
counsel are appropriate. But should we not leave Congress and the States latitude
to devise other means (if they can) which might also create an interrogation
climate which has the similar effect of preventing the fettering of a person's own
will?19
Chief Justice Warren reworked his draft opinion of Miranda to accommodate
Justice Brennan's suggestions. The new language caught William Rehnquist's
attention even before he ascended to the Supreme Court.2" And when he wrote the
opinion of the Court in Michigan v. Tucker maintaining that the Miranda Court itself
had "recognized" that theMiranda rules were "not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution" but only "procedural safeguards" designed to "insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination was protected,"' Justice Rehnquist again relied
on the language in Miranda that the author of the opinion had added at Justice
Brennan's request.'
In addition to arguing that the post-Warren Court has ignored important
18. AlbertW. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv.L.REv. 1436,1443
(1987).
19. For a discussion of, and substantial extracts from, Justice Brennan's lengthy memorandum to the Chief Justlce
(including the extract which appears in the text of this paper), see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84
CORNELL.REV. 109, 123-25 (1998). InMalloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court, perBrennan,J., toldus that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states to its full extent and that the voluntariness
of a confession "is controlled by [the self-incrimination] portion of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 7.
20. As noted in Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good OldDays ofPolice
Interrogation, 48 OHO. ST. L.J. 733, 738-39 n.44 (1987), in June, 1969, the Department of Justice sent to the U.S.
Attorneys a memorandum drafted in the Office of Legal Counsel--an office then headed by future Justice
Rehnquist-characterizing the Miranda warnings as "not themselves constitutional absolutes," but "a protective
measure," "a means, suggested by the Court, by which the accused's Fifth Amendment privilege may be safeguarded."
21. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
22. See Weisselberg, supra note 19, at 128-29. As Weisselberg points out, Justice Rehnquist's statement is
misleading. The Miranda Court did point out that the Constitution does not "require[] adherence to any particular
solution for the inherentcompulsions of the interrogation process," 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added), but it made clear
that "unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their [rights]
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise [them], the [Miranda warnings] must be observed." Id. (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 34.465
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language in the Miranda opinion,23 defenders of Miranda would maintain more
generally that the privilege against self-incrimination, along with other constitutional
rights, needs "breathing space."24 What theMiranda Court did, they would maintain,
was to try to assure that no confession actually compelled would be admitted into
evidence by establishing conclusive presumptions and related forms of "prophylactic"
rules to "implement" or to "reinforce" the privilege against self-incrimination--in
order to guard against actual constitutional violations. Is this improper?
Yes, retorts a leading critic of the Warren Court, Joseph Grano. As the Court
now characterizes what it did in Miranda, maintains Professor Grano, that case is an
"illegitimate" decision. To permit federal courts to impose "prophylactic rules" on
the states, i.e., rules that may be violated without directly violating the Constitution,
contends Grano, is "to say in essence that federal courts have supervisory power over
state courts."26 According to him, the Court lacks constitutional authority to overturn
state convictions when the Constitution has not actually been violated.
A provision of the federal criminal code enacted in 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
purports to "repeal" Miranda and reinstate the due process-"totality of the
circumstances"-"voluntariness" test for the admissibility of confessions. The validity
of § 3501 may turn on whether or not Professor Grano's characterization of Miranda
is sound.
As Justice Scalia pointed out recently, § 3501 "has been studiously avoided by
every Administration... since its enactment more than 25 years ago."27 Justice
Scalia sharply criticized the Justice Department's "repeated refusal to invoke §
3501," a refusal that has "caused the federal judiciary to confront a host of
'Miranda' issues that might be entirely irrelevant under federal law." Scalia has
23. See supra note 22.
24. Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.s. 545, 565 (1977) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Bursey, a co-defendant (actually an undercover agent) attended a pretrial meeting between defendant and his lawyer.
Although a majority of the Court rejected the argument that such an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship
constituted a perse violation of the defendant's right to effective counsel regardless of the agent's purpose in attending
the meeting (the district court found thatthe agent accepted an invitation to attend the meeting to avoid raising suspicion
that he was an informant) and regardless of whether the agent reported anything he learned at the meeting to his
superiors or to the prosecution (the district court found that the agent had revealed nothing said or done at the meeting),
Bursey sheds light as to when and why a prophylactic rule should be utilized. As dissenting Justice Marshall observed:
[E]ven if I were to agree that unintended and undisclosed interceptions by government witness-
employees affect neither the fairness of trials nor the effectiveness of defense counsel, I still could
not join in upholding the practice [of having a government agent attend a meeting of the defense
team at which defense plans are reviewed]. For in my view, the precious constitutional rights at
stake here, like other constitutional rights, need "breathing space to survive," NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415,433 (1963), and a prophylactic prohibition on all intrusions of this sort is therefore
essential. A rule that offers defendants relief only when they can prove "intent" or "disclosure"
is, I fear, little better than no rule at all. Establishing that a desire to intercept confidential
communications was a factor in a State's decision to keep an agent under cover will seldom be
possible, since the State always can argue plausibly that its sole purpose was to continue to enjoy
the legitimate services of the undercover agent. Proving that an informer reported to the
prosecution on defense strategy will be equally difficult.
Id.
25. JOSEPHD.GRANO, CONFEssIONS, TRtrHANDTHELAw 174, 185-98 (1993).
26. Id. at 191.
27. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,464 (1994) (concurring opinion).
28. Id. at 465.
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also maintained that because § 3501 "is a provision of law directed to the courts,
reflecting the people's assessment of the proper balance to be struck [in this area],
[wie shirk our duty if we systematically disregard that statutory command simply
because the Justice Department systematically declines to remind us of it."'29
The failure of the Justice Department to invoke § 3501 did not discourage two
conservative legal groups, the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets
Coalition. Led by the indefatigable Paul Cassell, a Utah Law School professor who
has become the nation's leading critic of Miranda,0 these groups repeatedly urged
the federal courts to inject § 3501 into their cases.
Recently, after the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court's ruling suppressing
defendant's confession on the ground that the confession had been obtained in
violation of Miranda,31 these organizations moved to proceed as amici curiae,
maintaining that the confession should have been admitted, despite the Miranda
violation, unless it failed to satisfy the more lenient standard for admissibility set
forth in § 3501. To the surprise of many, the Fourth Circuit then issued an order
directing the parties to consider the effect of § 3501 on the admissibility of defen-
dant's confession.
Since the government had not pressed § 3501 before the district court or the
court of appeals as a basis for a determination that defendant's confession was
admissible, the Fourth Circuit declined to rehear the appeal. But the court voiced
strong disagreement with the Justice Department's view that Miranda "remains
binding on lower federal courts notwithstanding § 3501 unless or until it is modified
by the Supreme Court."
A year and a half later, in United States v. Dickerson,32 the Fourth Circuit gave
the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition a stunning victory.
Although the dissenting judge protested that the ruling was made "without the benefit
of any briefing in opposition" and "against the express wishes of the Department of
Justice,, 33 a 2-1 majority held that the pre-Miranda voluntariness test set forth in §
3501, rather than the famous Miranda case, governs the admissibility of confessions
in the federal courts. Therefore, the district court had erred when it had suppressed
a voluntary confession simply because it was obtained in violation of Miranda.
The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit may be summarized quite briefly: Congress
has the power to "overrule" rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by
the Constitution. The Miranda rules are not constitutionally required; they are only
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U.L. REV. 387
(1996); Paul G. Cassell,AllBenefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion ofMiranda'sDefenders, 90 Nw.U.L.R v. 1084
(1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (1998).
31. See United States v. Leong, 116 F. 3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). The discussion of
the proceedings in Leong is based on an account of the case set forth in YAE KAMJSAR Er At., MODERN CRmINAL
PROCEURE 70-74 (1998 Supp.) which, in turn, is based heavily on materials about the case provided by Paul Cassell.
Professor Cassell served as counsel for Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition in
Leong.
32. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
33. Id. at 695 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 34:465
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"prophylactic" rules designed to implement or reinforce the underlying constitutional
right. Therefore, § 3501 is a valid exercise of Congressional authority to override
judicially created rules not part of the Constitution.
I must disagree with the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit panel. I do not believe
that the Warren Court lacked constitutional authority to overturn state convictions
resting on statements that were not shown to be "involuntary" or "coerced" in the pre-
Miranda sense of these terms.
I share Stephen Schulhofer's view that the conclusive presumption of
compulsion adopted by the Miranda Court was "a responsible reaction to the
problems of the voluntariness test, to the rarity of cases in which compelling
pressures are truly absent, and to the adjudicatory costs of case-by-case decisions in
this area." '34 And I agree with Schulhofer's colleague, David Strauss, that prophylac-
tic rules are "a central and necessary feature of constitutional law."35
Suppose Miranda had established a rebuttable presumption that any
incriminating statement obtained in a custodial setting without the Miranda
safeguards (or equally effective procedures) is compelled, but that this presumption
could be overcome if the suspect were a police officer, lawyer, law student or a
person with a Ph.D. in criminology. Such a presumption would produce the same
result a conclusive presumption would in the great bulk of cases. But so far as I
know, everybody agrees that a court's responsibility to achieve accurate fact finding
permits it to assign burdens of proof and to adopt rebuttable presumptions. As
Professor Strauss argues, if it is legitimate for a court to decide that evidence of
voluntariness is legally immaterial in some cases (where the evidence is insufficient
to overcome a rebuttable presumption), why should it be improper for a court to
extend this approach to all cases?3 6
A "prophylactic" rule is not a dirty word. Sometimes such rules are necessary
and proper. The privilege against self-incrimination, no less than other constitutional
rights, needs "breathing space." And prophylactic rules may be the best way to
provide it.
Miranda is based on the realization that case-by-case determination of the
"voluntariness" of a confession in light of the totality of the circumstances was
severely testing the capacity of the judiciary and that institutional realities warranted
a conclusive presumption that a confession obtained under certain conditions and in
the absence of certain safeguards was compelled. The pre-Miranda "voluntariness"
test was too mushy, subjective, and unruly to provide suspects with adequate
protection.37 And it was too time-consuming to administer. As Justice Hugo Black
expressed it during the oral arguments in Miranda: "If you are going to determine
the admissibility of a confession each time on the circumstances... if the Court will
34. Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 453.
35. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cmi. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988).
36. See id. at 193-94.
37. See Yale KarisarA Dissent from the Miranda Dissents (1966), in POucEMERROGAONANDCONFSIONS
41,69-76 (1980).
1999]
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take them one by one.., it is more than we are capable of doing., 31
In 1966, after years of struggling with the "voluntariness" test, a majority of the
Supreme Court had arrived at the same conclusion that this traditional test was
woefully inadequate and simply unworkable. Something else was needed, something
easier to administer. That "something else" turned out to be Miranda. Under any
sensible approach to constitutional interpretation, the Supreme Court must be allowed
to take into account its own fact-finding limitations.
Establishing presumptions and prophylactic rules is inherent in the art of
judging-in the effort to make constitutional rights more meaningful. The Fourth
Circuit panel that decided Dickerson did a lot more than try to deal Miranda a fatal
blow. Its approach to constitutional decision-making restricts the ability of the
Rehnquist Court-and every court-to interpret constitutional provisions in light of
institutional realities.
A good example of how the Court promulgates a "prophylactic rule" in order
to compensate for its fact-finding limitations is North Carolina v. Pearce.39 A
number of defendants had successfully overturned their original convictions only to
have the judge give them a heavier sentence for the same crime when they were retried
and reconvicted. There was reason to think that in some of these cases, at least,
sentencing judges were "punishing" defendants for having succeeded in getting their
first convictions set aside. As the Court noted, however, "[t]he existence of a
retaliatory motivation would.., be extremely difficult to prove in any individual
case."
40
What did the Pearce Court do? It established what has "come to be called a
'presumption of vindictiveness .':41 "In order to assure the absence of [a retaliatory]
motivation" it held that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a
defendant after a new trial, the reasons [for] doing so must affirmatively appear [and]
must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.,
41
Absent such a showing, vindictiveness against the defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction is to be presumed and the sentence he received on retrial
struck down as a violation of due process.
The Court subsequently made plain that Pearce had created a "prophylactic
rule" and that "prophylactic" was not a dirty word. Speaking for a 7-2 majority (one
that included Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist), Justice White explained
Pearce as a case where, "[p]ositing that a more severe penalty after reconviction
would violate due process ... imposed as purposeful punishment for having
successfully appealed," the Court concluded that "such untoward sentences occurred
with sufficient frequency to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule."43
38. Id. at 75.
39. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
40. Id. at 725 n.20.
41. CHARLEs H. WsiRi & CImsOpm SLOoGiN, CRINALPROcEDtuR 762 (3d ed. 1993).
42. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
43. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 34.465
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A year later, again speaking for a 7-2 majority that included Burger and
Rehnquist, Justice Powell (who has never been accused of being enthused about the
Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure), explained and defended "the
Pearce prophylactic rules" by analogizing them to the Miranda rules:
By eliminating the possibility that [improper considerations] might occasion
enhanced sentences, the Pearce prophylactic rules assist in guaranteeing the
propriety of the sentencing phase of the criminal process. In this protective role,
Pearce is analogous to Miranda.... which the Court established rules to govern
police practices during custodial interrogations in order to safeguard the rights of
the accused and to assure the reliability of statements made during these
interrogations. Thus, the prophylactic rules in Pearce and Miranda are similar in
that each was designed to preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal
process.44
Justice Powell and the six Justices who joined him seemed untroubled by the
fact that in many instances application of the Pearce rule would benefit defendants
whose rights had not actually been violated-who had not actually been the victims
of vindictiveness.45 This was a good reason for not applying Pearce retroactively to
resentencing proceedings that took place prior to the Pearce decision.4 (just as
Miranda had not been applied retroactively),47 but it was not a valid reason for failing
to apply the rule prospectively. It is "an inherent attribute of prophylactic constitu-
tional rules" that their application will benefit "some defendants who have suffered
no constitutional deprivation."
In still another case applying Pearce, even Chief Justice Burger seemed
unperturbed by its "prophylactic" nature. Speaking for a majority of the Court that
included Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice matter of factly recalled that in order
"[t]o prevent actual vindictiveness from entering into a decision and allay any fear on
the part of a defendant that an increased sentence is in fact the product of vindictive-
ness, the [Pearce] Court fashioned what in essence is a 'prophylactic rule."' 49 But
the Court did not say this disapprovingly.
Neither the Chief Justice nor any other member of the Court complained that
the Pearce rule had enabled federal courts to exercise their "supervisory power over
state courts." Nobody seemed troubled that a defendant who had received an
increased sentence on retrial could establish a due process violation without showing
actual vindictiveness. Nor did anybody suggest that Pearce was an "illegitimate"
decision.
North Carolina v. Pearce is usually classified as an "appeals" case or a
"double jeopardy" case. But one need not stray from the field of confessions to find
44. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47,53 (1973).
45. See id. at 53-54.
46. The Court held that Pearce would not apply retroactively in Payne. See id. at 57.
47. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US. 719 (1966).
48. Payne, 412 U.S. at 53.
49. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559,564 (1984).
1999]
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other examples of "prophylactic rules" whoselegitimacy has been accepted or at least
assumed. Indeed, one need go no further than Miranda's own progeny.
Marking one of the few times the post-Warren Court has read Miranda rather
broadly, Edwards v. Arizona" held that when a suspect effectively asserts his right
to a lawyer (as opposed to his right to remain silent)5 the suspect may not be
subjected to further police questioning until counsel has been made available to him
unless he himself initiates further conversation with the police.52 This means that the
police cannot try to change the suspect's mind-not even if they give him a fresh set
of warnings at the outset of a new interrogation session. Rather, they must wait to
see whether the suspect changes his mind on his own initiative.
Edwards held, in effect (in a forceful opinion by Justice White, and a surprising
one considering his angry dissent in Miranda), that when a custodial suspect invokes
his right to counsel, there is a conclusive presumption that any subsequent waiver of
rights that comes at police instigation, not at the suspect's own behest, is compelled.
To put it somewhat differently, Edwards in effect established a new "prophylactic
rule" that built on and reinforced Miranda's "prophylactic rules."
It will not do to say that the Edwards rule was required by the Miranda
decision. Six years prior to Edwards, the Court had held that if a suspect asserts his
"right to silence" (as opposed to his right to counsel) the police may, if they cease
questioning on the spot, "try again"--and succeed at a subsequent interrogation.53
The Court could have plausibly held that invocation of the right to counsel should be
treated no differently than assertion of the right to silence. Indeed, as I have
maintained elsewhere, I do not think it makes much sense to draw a distinction based
on which Miranda right a suspect happens to trigger.5"
Why, then, did the Burger Court establish, and the Rehnquist Court reaffirm
and expand, what the Court has recently called "the bright-line, prophylactic
Edwards rule"?55 In Minnick v. Mississippi,56 a 7-2 majority of the Rehnquist Court
(only Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented) told us the
following:
The [Edwards] rule ensures that any statement made [by a suspect who has
previously asserted his right to counsel] is not the result of coercive pressures.
Edwards conserves judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in
making difficult determinations of voluntariness.57
Is this not an explanation and defense of Miranda itself as well as Edwards?
50. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
51. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
52. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
53. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 96.
54. See JESSEH.CHOPERErAL.,THESUPREMatCoUR TR DSANDDEVELOPMENMr 1982-83 at 153-58 (1984)
(remarks of Kamisar).
55. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,682 (1988).
56. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
57. Id. at 151.
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To be sure, as Professor Grano once said to me in a debate about Miranda's
legitimacy, the fact that the Rehnquist Court has reaffirmed and expanded the
Edwards rule does not conclusively refute the argument that Miranda is an
"illegitimate" or extra-constitutional decision-that the Rehnquist Court may also
have transgressed proper boundaries does not change the fact that the Court lacks
constitutional authority to overturn state convictions when the Constitution has not
actually been violated. That may be so, but it sure makes it unlikely that the
Rehnquist Court will overrule Miranda on this ground. It also makes it unlikely that
the Rehnquist Court will uphold § 3501 on this ground.
Further evidence that prophylactic constitutional rules are not to be demeaned
is provided by Withrow v. Williams.58 When the Court held that a state prisoner
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim could not
obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that illegally seized evidence was used
against him in the state prosecution, 9 many assumed that a similar restriction on the
exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction would apply to a state prisoner's claim that his
conviction rested on statements obtained in violation of Miranda. For there was little
reason to think that the post-Warren Court had a warmer spot in its heart for
Miranda than it did for the search and seizure exclusionary rule. But the Withrow
Court confounded the prognosticators.
The government argued in Withrow that since the Miranda rules "are not
constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,"' federal habeas review should
not extend to claims based on violations of these rules.6' A majority of the Court was
not impressed; it accepted the government's characterization of the Miranda
safeguards, for purposes of the case, but not the government's conclusion.
Justice Souter, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Withrow, did not deny that
"we have sometimes called the Miranda safeguards 'prophylactic' in nature"6'
(because, explained Souter, violation of these safeguards might lead to the exclusion
of statements that would not be found "involuntary" under pre-Miranda standards).
But this, he noted, is a "far cry" from putting Miranda in the same category as the
search and seizure exclusionary rule or from rendering Miranda subject to the same
restrictions on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction that apply to search and
seizure cases. 62
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, observed the Court, cannot "be
thought to enhance the soundness of the criminal process by improving the reliability
of evidence introduced at trial, ''63 butMiranda differs in this respect: "'Prophylactic'
though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right."'64 It "brace[s] against
58. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
59. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
60. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 690.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 691.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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'the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interroga-
tion,"' and thereby "serves to guard against 'the use of unreliable statements at
trial. "65
B. Other Threats to Miranda
Assuming arguendo that I am right-that the Court will reject the argument that
§ 3501 "overrules" Miranda-that famous case is not out of danger. The Rehnquist
Court may still deal Miranda some heavy blows.
For one thing, the Court may uphold the use for impeachment purposes of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda even when the police deliberately violate
a suspect's rights for the very purpose of obtaining evidence for impeachment
purposes. For another thing, the Court may permit the government to use all the
clues and physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation. Still worse,
the Court may allow the government to do so even when the police deliberately
commit a Miranda violation for the very purpose of obtaining clues and other
derivative evidence.
As Professor Carol Steiker has pointed out, in discussing the Warren Court and
its successor Courts it is helpful to distinguish between "conduct" rules (those
addressed to law enforcement officials) and "decision" rules (those addressed to
courts regarding the consequences of unconstitutional conduct).66 Although they have
left the Warren Court's "conduct" rules relatively intact, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have "wag[ed] counter-revolutionary war" against the Warren Court's
"decision" rules.67 And they have done so by developing a number of what Professor
Steiker calls "'inclusionary rules'-rules that permit the use at trial of admittedly
unconstitutionally obtained evidence or that let stand criminal convictions based on
such evidence." 8
These "inclusionary" rules, Steiker persuasively argues, "represent a departure
from the Warren Court's understanding of the judicial consequences of constitutional
violations by the police that is much more dramatic than the changes made in police-
conduct rules over the same period of time."69 Good examples of "inclusionary" rules
are the post-Warren Court doctrines regarding the use of statements obtained in
violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes and the use of evidence derivedfrom
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, i.e., the admissibility of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree."
The first blow the post-Warren Court struck Miranda was Harris v. New
York,70 which held that statements preceded by defective warnings, and thus
65. Id. at 692.
66. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, 7vo
Answers, 94 MICH. L. Rmv. 2466,2469-71 (1996).
67. Id.at2470.
68. Id.at2469.
69. Id. at 2504.
70. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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inadmissable in the government's case-in-chief, could still be used to impeach the
defendant's credibility if he chose to take the witness stand. Four years later, in
Oregon v. Hass,7 the Court went a considerable step further. In this case, after
being advised of his rights, the suspect had asserted his right to counsel. But the
police had continued to question him. The Court ruled that in this situation, too, the
resulting statements could be used for impeachment cases. However, there is, I think,
an important distinction between the facts in Harris and those in Hass.
Many suspects make incriminating statements even after being given a full set
of warnings. Therefore, Harris might have been explained (and contained) on the
ground that permitting impeachment use of statements obtained without complete
warnings would not significantly encourage the police to violate Miranda. However,
now that Hass is on the books, when a suspect asserts his right to counsel, the police
seem to have virtually nothing to lose and something to gain by continuing to
question the suspect in violation of Miranda.
The Hass Court took notice of this argument, but dismissed it as a "speculative
possibility." '72 It's not easy to establish, but if and when it can be established that the
police deliberately ignored a suspect's assertion of his rights for the very purpose of
obtaining impeachment evidence, are we still in the realm of speculation?
TheHass Court saw no need to bar the impeachment use of statements obtained
in violation of Miranda because "there is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in
question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief."73 (Now that's
speculation.) But how can a court maintain that position when it is clear that the fact
that the statements could not be used in the government's case in chief failed to deter
the officer? When the officer deliberately violated Miranda in order to secure
impeachment evidence?
This is why it was so discouraging when last year the California Supreme Court
rejected the argument that Hass was based on the assumption that a purposeful or
deliberate violation of Miranda and Edwards would not occur.74 I can only hope that
the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the California court's remarkable conclusion that
evidence of "a purpose to violate the suspect's rights in order to secure [impeach-
ment] evidence" only "call[s] into question" the accuracy of the U.S. Supreme
Court's assumption in the impeachment cases that "police misconduct will be
deterred adequately by excluding improperly obtained evidence from the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief, but such evidence does not render the [impeachment exception]
inapplicable."
Why not? What does it take to demolish the unexamined and unsupported
assumption that "sufficient deterrence" is provided so long as statements obtained in
violation of Miranda are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief?
71. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
72. Id. at 723.
73. Id. at 722.
74. See People v. Peevy, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865,867 (Cal. 1998).
75. Id. at 875-76.
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Oregon v. Elstad76 represents an even more serious threat to Miranda than do
the impeachment cases. Indeed, short of flatly overruling Miranda or upholding the
federal statute purporting to "repeal" it, Elstad poses the greatest danger of all.
In that case, in the course of ruling that the fact that the police had obtained a
statement from the defendant in violation of Miranda when they questioned him
earlier at his home did not bar the admissibility of a second statement, made at the
station house, when this time the police had complied with Miranda, the Court
indicated that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to Miranda at
all.' If so, all the "fruits" of, or evidence derived from, a Miranda violation would
be admissible, whether they are a second confession, a prosecution witness or
physical evidence.
Elstad can plausibly be read very narrowly. For one thing, the failure to advise
Mr. Elstad of his Miranda rights seemed to be inadvertent. If, for example, Elstad
had invoked his right to counsel at the first meeting and the police had refused to
honor that right, the result might have been different." Moreover, as dissenting
Justice Brennan pointed out in Elstad, the majority "relies heavily on individual
'volition' as an insulating factor in successive-confession cases"--a factor
"altogether missing in the context of inanimate evidence. 79
However, at several places in her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor tells us
that the poisonous tree doctrine assumes the existence of an underlying constitutional
violation-for example, a violation of the Fourth Amendment or "police infringement
of the Fifth Amendment itself. °80 And it is plain that the Elstad majority did not
believe that a Miranda violation qualifies as a "constitutional violation."',
The Court has never explicitly addressed the question whether physical or
nontestimonial evidence derived from a Miranda violation is admissible. However,
I have to say that there is a good chance that it will answer that question in the
affirmative. In the meantime, ever sinceElstad was decided, "federal and state courts
have almost uniformly ruled that the prosecution can introduce nontestimonial fruits
of a Miranda violation in a criminal trial.,82
"It has been said," observed Judge Henry Friendly some thirty years ago, "that
'what data there are' suggest that the obtaining of leads with which to obtain real or
demonstrative evidence or prosecution witnesses is more important than getting
statements for use in court."8 3 A good deal more recently, another commentator
similarly noted that "[e]xpert interrogators have long recognized, and continue to
76. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
77. See id. at 307-08.
78. At one point in her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor distinguished cases such as Elstad, where the police
failed to advise a suspect of hisMiranda rights at their first meeting, from cases "concerning suspects whose invocation
oftheirrights ... were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation." Id. at 313 n.3.
79. Id. at 347 n.29.
80. Id. at 309; see also id. at 304-05,308.
81. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,307-08 (1985).
82. David A. Wollin,Policing thePolice: Should Miranda Violations BearFruit?, 53 OmoST.LJ. 805,835-36
(1992).
83. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CiN. L.REv.
671,712 n. 176 (1968).
[Vol. 34:-465
HeinOnline  -- 34 Tulsa L.J. 478 1998-1999
CONFESSIONS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
instruct, that a coniession is a primary source for determining the existence and
whereabouts of the fruits of a crime, such as documents or weapons."84
Therefore, a ruling that all types of evidence derived from a Miranda violation
are admissible would strike the landmark case a grievous blow. How could we
possibly expect the police to comply with Miranda if the courts barred only the use
of incriminating statements obtained in violation of that doctrine, but none of the
leads or clues or evidence these statements brought to light?
A decade ago, in order to underscore the potential cumulative effect of the
various exceptions to Miranda that the post-Warren Court had carved out, Professor
Albert Alschuler discussed the various ways to get around Miranda that a hypotheti-
cal unscrupulous police training instructor might teach young officers. 5 However,
it is now clear that we are no longer dealing with hypothetical police instructors or
imaginary police training materials.
Last year we learned that lawyers seeking to prohibit officers in two California
police departments from questioning custodial suspects after they have asserted their
Miranda rights, had come upon police training materials that instruct officers to "go
'outsideMiranda,"' i. e., to continue to question someone who has invoked his rights,
(e.g., clearly asserted his right to counsel) so that the police may learn the where-
abouts of physical evidence the prosecution may use, or so that the police may
acquire the names of other witnesses the prosecution may call, or so that the police
may obtain statements the prosecution can use if the defendant takes the stand in his
own defense.86
The deputy district attorney who made the training videotape is not unaware
that some police officers may feel a bit uncomfortable deliberately violating Miranda.
He reassures these fastidious officers as follows:
When you violate Miranda, you're not violating the Constitution... [There's] no
law says you can't question people "outside Miranda".
[When we question someone who has invoked his Miranda rights] [a]ll we lose
is the statement taken in violation of Miranda. We do not lose physical evidence
that resulted from that. We do not lose the testimony of other witnesses that we
learned about only by violating his Miranda invocation.'
Unfortunately, the deputy district attorney is right about the testimony of other
witnesses whose whereabouts are learned only by violating Miranda. He may be
84. Wollin, supra note 82, at 845.
85. See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 1442-43.
86. The full transcript of the California police training videotape discussed in this text is reprinted in the appendix
to Weisselberg, supra note 19. Substantial extracts from the training tape appear in KAmIAR ErAL, supra note 31,
at 93.
87. Weisselberg, supra note 19, at 191-92.
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right about the use of physical evidence as well. But the Court has not yet made it
clear that physical evidence discovered as a result of a Miranda violation may also
be used by the prosecution. However, there is a distinct possibility that the Court will
so hold in the near future. If it does, we can be sure that police training instructors
would call it to the attention of their students. Indeed, if the recently discovered
California police training videotape is any indication, police officers are already
being instructed that if a custodial suspect invokes his Miranda rights, what the
officers can "legally do" is continue to question him because "[a]ll we lose is the
statement taken in violation of Miranda. We do not lose physical evidence that
resulted from that."88
I am painfully aware that a number of Justices view Miranda as occupying a
lowly position in the hierarchy of rights. Nevertheless, I cannot believe this Court
would admit the fruits of a Miranda violation obtained pursuant to a police
department policy of violating Miranda for the very purpose of obtaining derivative
evidence. If it turns out I am wrong about this, we should simply give Miranda a
"respectful burial."'89
C. Coerced Confessions and the "Rule of Automatic Reversal"
As Professor Steiker has noted, not only has the post-Warren Court
"promulgat[ed] 'inclusionary rules' that make possible the admission of evidence that
has been obtained through unconstitutional conduct of law enforcement agents," by
changing rules governing the standard of review on appeal and on federal habeas
corpus it has made it harder for the erroneous admission of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence at trial to lead to the overturning of convictions.' To be sure, it
was the Warren Court that first recognized a doctrine of harmless constitutional
error.9' (Prior to the 1960s, it was generally assumed that constitutional error could
never be regarded "harmless error.") But the Court was careful to note that some
constitutional rights-it specifically mentioned the right against admission of a
coerced confession-are "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be
treated as harmless error."
However, as Judge Harry Edwards recently observed, the post-Warren Court
has "dramatically expanded the list of constitutional violations that are subject to
harmless-error analysis" and has "subtract[ed] one" from the list of those errors
88. Weisselberg, supra note 19; text accompanying notes 19,86.
89. Cf Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. See Steiker, supra note 66, at 2527-28.
91. There maybe some constitutional errors, concluded the Warren Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
22 (1967), "which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with
the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." But the Court
went on to say that the error in Chapman (permitting the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to take the
stand) was not "harmless." Because of its repeated references to defendant's failure to take the stand, the state could
not possibly demonstrate that the error was"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," i.e., prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error did not contribute to the conviction.
92. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 & n.8.
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thought to be "per se reversible."93 In Arizona v. Fulminante,4 (a case about which
another participant in the University of Tulsa Conference, Justice Stanley Mosk, had
some understandably harsh things to say),95 a 5-4 majority of the Rehnquist Court
overruled a long line of cases' and held that the improper admission of a coerced
confession was subject to "harmless error" analysis.'
TheFulminante majority, per ChiefJusticeRehnquist, drew-and relied heavily
on-a distinction between (a) "trial errors," which may be "quantitatively assessed"
in the context of other evidence presented and (b) "structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism" which pervade the entire conduct of the trial and
thus "defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards." (The Chief Justice viewed the
other two constitutional violations referred to in Chapman as reversibleper se-total
deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and trial before a judge who is not
impartial-as "structural defects.")98
Two decades earlier, a 5-4 majority of the Burger Court had held that even
though a post-indictment confession made to a police officer posing as defendant's
"celimate" should have been excluded on Sixth Amendment-Massiah grounds, any
error was harmless.9 Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, the great majority of
lower courts had applied the "harmless error" rule to the erroneous admission of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.' 0
This led Chief Justice Rehnquist to say in Fulminante that "[t]he evidentiary
impact of an involuntary confession, and its effect upon the composition of the record,
is indistinguishable from that of a confession obtained in violation of the Sixth
93. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?,
70N.Y.U.L.REv. 1167, 1176 (1995). For strong criticism of the expansion ofthe harmless error doctrine, see Steven
H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421,427 (1980); Tom
Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 CoLM. L. REv. 79-81 (1988).
94. 499 U.S.279 (1991).
95. See Stanley Mosk, Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, in TE REHNQuiSr CouT. FARaWaL TO E OLD
ORDER IN THE COURT? (Martin H. Belsky ed. 1999 forthcoming) (paper delivered at the University of Tulsa College
of Law Conference on The Rehnquist Court, Sept. 17, 1998).
96. Thenrleofautomaticreversal for improperly admitted coereed confessions dates back to Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). See Yale Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process, 61 MICtL L.REv. 219,236 (1962); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofApplying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L.REV. 151, 152 (1991).
97. However, a 5-3 majority of the Court concluded that, under the circumstances, the admission of Fulminante's
confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman maintained that a constitutional error could be viewed as harmless only if the prosecution "prove[d]
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error... did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
But Harrington v. California,395 U.S. 250 (1969), seemed to say that the error could be deemed harmless if the
remaining untainted evidence of guilt was "overwhelming." Id. at 254; see also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371
(1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972). As Judge Edwards has noted, "the Harrington approach to
harmless-error analysis--one of looking to whether the record evidence adequately demonstrates the appellant's guilt,
rather than whether the error contributed to the verdict-has become standard practice for many appellate panels
considering both constitutional and nonconstitutional error." Edwards, supra note 93, at 1186-87. But Arizona v.
Fulminante, discussed immediately below, seems to mark a return to the Chapman approach and to be "far removed
from the guilt-based version of harmless error found in Harrington." Id. at 1190.
98. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-10. For powerful criticism of the distinction between "trial errors" and
"structural defects," see Ogletree, supra note 96, at 162-64.
99. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). The reference in the text is to Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
100. See Steiker, supra note 66, at 2527-28.
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Amendment" '0 -- or one inadmissiblefor any other reason. The Chief Justice would
have us believe that for "harmless error" purposes an inadmissible confession is an
inadmissible confession. But this is not so.
The magnitude of the police illegality in a case like Oregon v. Elstad, " where
the police briefly questioned a suspect in his own living room without first giving him
the Miranda warnings is not of the same order as the magnitude of the police
misconduct in cases likeMalinski (where police interrogation stripped off defendant's
clothes and kept him naked for several hours) 3 and Payne (where the chief of police
threatened to turn a young black over to a mob waiting outside the jailhouse unless
he confessed)" 4 and Rogers (where, in order to get the defendant to confess, the
police threatened to "bring in" his wife for questioning). 5 It was in Malinski, Payne
and Rogers and cases like them that the Court firmly established the "rule of
automatic reversal"--and it was driven to do so, I think it fair to say, by the felt need
to condemn police methods that violated fundamental values and offended a civilized
system of justice."06
That they coerced a confession out of a suspect is about as bad a thing one can
say of the police. When such a confession is erroneously admitted at trial it casts a
dark shadow on the integrity of the criminal process that led to a conviction. That is
why I think when the Court adopted and first applied the "rule of automatic reversal"
in such cases it said in effect: Regardless of other evidence of guilt, a coerced
confession deeply stains the criminal process. This is not an occasion for speculation
about the impact of the confession on the trier of fact. Do it over again-without the
confession.'07
To be sure, the police misconduct in Fulminante was not as egregious as it had
been in many of the earlier coerced confession cases. While in prison, the defendant
had been befriended by another inmate, Sarivola, who, unknown to the defendant, was
a paid informant for the FBI masquerading as an organized crime figure. On hearing
a rumor that defendant had killed his stepdaughter, Sarivola told the defendant that
he was receiving and would continue to receive "tough treatment" from other inmates
because of the rumor but that he, Sarivola, would protect him from the other
prisoners if defendant told him the truth about the murder. At that point, defendant
101. Fulmninante, 499 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added).
102. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
103. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 402,403 (1945).
104. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,565 (1958).
105. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534,536 (1961).
106. As Justice O'Connor observed for a majority in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), the Court has "long
held that certain interrogation techniques... are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be
condemned under the Due Process Clause ...." Id. at 109.
107. Dissenting inChapmanthecasethatfirstrecognized thatsome constitutional errorscouldbeharmlessJustice
Harlan observed that one reason that some constitutional errors fall into the "automatic-reversal" category is that they
are so contrary to fundamental values or so undermine public respect for the integrity of the criminal process that our
society cannot (or should not) "tolerate" acceptance of a judgment tainted by such an error. See Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 53 n.7. I share the view that this is why for so many years the Court applied a "rule ofautomatic reversal" to coerced
confessions. See also WAYNER.LAFAVE&JERoLDH. ISRAEL, CRMNALPROCEDURE§ 26.6(d) (1984); WH=rHREAD
& SLOBOGIN, supra note 41, at 778-79.
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confessed to Sarivola that he had committed the murder.
In overturning the "rule of automatic reversal" for improperly admitted coerced
confessions, Chief Justice noted that "there are no allegations of physical violence on
behalf of the police. 1. 8 But what exactly is his point?
Some forty years ago, the Court pointed out that "coercion can be mental as
well as physical and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark" of a
coerced confession." Having found it "impossible to create a meaningful distinc-
tion" for harmless error analysis-those are Chief Justice Rehnquist's
words-between coerced confessions and confessions inadmissible on other
grounds ° -surely the Chief Justice is not prepared to create a meaningful
distinction, for harmless error purposes, between coerced confessions marked by
physical violence and those not so marked-between barely or mildly coerced
confessions and egregiously coerced ones."'
If all inadmissible confessions are to be treated alike for harmless error
purposes, and that is the best reading of Fulminante, then surely all coerced
confessions are to be treated alike. In this context, at least, a coerced confession is
a coerced confession. Henceforth, all coerced confessions, even those beaten out of
a suspect, will be subject to harmless-error analysis.
Constitutional violations not subject to harmless error now include not only a
total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial and a biased judge, but racial
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury. 12 However, if a defendant has been
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a properly constituted petit jury at a trial
on the merits free of any other error, how can the error that occurred in the selection
of the grand jury be classified, as the Chief Justice does in Fulminante, as a
"structural defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds?""' 3
A grand jury proceeding merely decides whether there is a prima facie case
against a defendant. Thus, "any possible prejudice to the defendant" resulting from
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury "disappears" when a constitu-
tionally valid trial jury later finds him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'1 14 It hardly
follows, therefore, as the Fulminante majority would have us believe, that whenever
racial discrimination takes place in selecting a grand jury the reliability of the
determination of guilt is suspect.115
108. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 311. There are three parts to the Court's decision in this case: (1) a 5-4 majority, per
White, J., agreed with the state supreme court that the confession was coerced; (2) a 5-4 majority, per Rehnquist, CJ.,
held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession was subject to "harmless error" analysis; and (3) still another
5-3 majority, per White, J., concluded that the admission of Fulminante's confession was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. at 280-8 1.
109. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,206 (1960).
110. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 312.
S111. I must say I do not understand why the Chief Justice finds it "impossible" to distinguish between coerced
confessions and other inadmissibleconfessions forharmless errorpurposes. The Court has had little difficulty in making
this very distinction in other contexts, For a discussion of the use of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda for
impeachment purposes and, in order to acquire derivative evidence, see notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
112. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
113. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at310.
114. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,575 (1979) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring).
115. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
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The best explanation for automatic reversal when there has been racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors is not that a structural error has
occurred whose effects are inherently indeterminate, but that a constitutional error of
large magnitude has taken place-one that "strikes at the fundamental values of our
judicial system and our society as a whole."" 6 The same, I think, can be said when
the police extract a confession from a person and that confession is then used against
him at his trial. The use of a coerced confession at one's trial, no less than
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, "destroys the appearance of justice and
thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process."'".7
I believe there is a good deal to be said for Judge Harry Edwards' view:
We have come a long way from the brutal beating with whips and leather straps
used to extract a confession in Brown v. Mississippi, or the thirty-six uninterrupted
hours of questioning under bright lights employed in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, but
we have done so only because the reversal of a conviction was the sure penalty for
these actions."'
In rejecting the argument that harmless-error analysis should govern instances
of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors, the Court, per Justice
Marshall, called such discrimination "a grave constitutional trespass" and noted that
if it "becomes a thing of the past, no conviction will ever again be lost on account of
it.""..9  Again, the same may be said for the erroneous admission of coerced
confessions.
More than sixty years after the Wickersham Commission exposed the ugly facts
of the "third degree" and more than thirty years after the Court decided Miranda, are
there still so many confessions being coerced and so many being improperly admitted
into evidence that we need a "harmless-error" doctrine to excuse some of them?
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
As Justice Stewart pointed out in lectures he delivered shortly after stepping
down from the High Court, 2 ' there are two principal ways to reduce the impact of
the search and seizure exclusionary rule: by narrowing the thrust of the exclusionary
rule and by shrinking the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself, thereby giving the
116. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 262 (Marshall, J.) (quoting from Justice Blackmun's opinion of the Court in Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,556 (1979)).
117. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,555-56 (1979) (explaining why racial discrimination is "especially pernicious
in the administration of justice").
118. Edwards, supra note 93, at 1197. The references are to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) and
Ashcrafi v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). Judge Edwards continues: "While I do not expect to see a resurrection
of such tactics in the law-enforcement community, Ido fear that unbridled judicial infatuation with harmless errorcould
lead to more subtle, but equally dangerous, adverse effects on the integrity of our system of justice." See id.
119. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 262.
120. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1397 (1983).
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police more leeway to investigate crime. Although not all post-Warren Court search
and seizure rulings have been in favor of the government, in the main the Court has
significantly reduced the impact of the exclusionary rule in both respects.
A. Narrowing the Thrust of the Exclusionary Rule
Although one would gain little inkling of this from the majority opinions of the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, originally and for much of its life the federal
exclusionary rule, first promulgated in the famous 1914 Weeks case, ' rested on what
might be called a "principled basis."'" The reasons for excluding evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment were to avoid "sanctioning" or "ratifying" the
police misconduct that produced the evidence, to keep the courts from being
contaminated by partnership in police misconduct, to prevent the government whose
agents had violated the Constitution from being in a better position than the
government whose officers had obeyed the Constitution, and-ultimately-to assure
the police and the public alike that courts take constitutional rights seriously."z
I believe this is the dominant theme of Mapp v. Ohio,2 4 the case that touched
off the Warren Court's revolution in American criminal procedure by imposing the
federal exclusionary rule on the states as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process. 1 5
Evidently Justice Clark, author of the majority opinion in Mapp, felt obligated
to refute all the arguments critics of the exclusionary rule had made over the
years-one of which was that the rule was not an effective deterrent or not markedly
superior to "other methods" in this regard. 2 6 Thus, at one point Justice Clark did
discuss whether or not exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence is a more effective
deterrent than "other means of protection" (Clark thought it was).' 27 But when one
considers the totality of Justice Clark's opinion the dominant message of Mapp is
fairly clear: Although not explicitly provided for in the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the exclusionary rule is a command of the Constitution.
Part I of the Mapp opinion emphasizes that the exclusionary rule is not "a mere
rule of evidence" or an exercise of the Court's "supervisory powers," but a
"constitutionally required" doctrine.' In Part I, the Court "hold[s] that all evidence
121. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
122. See Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than
an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGMONL.REv. 565,598-604 (1983) (discussion of Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, and
other early search and seizure cases).
123. See id.
124. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
125. As a close student of the Warren Court has observed, although some may argue that the Warren Court's
revolution began with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (a case that dealt with the appellate rights of indigent
defendants), "it was perhaps not until 1961 and [the Mapp decision] that a majority of the bench began consistently to
reflect those positions that one today considers distinctive of the Warren Court." Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest
for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519.
126. This was a major premise of Wolf, 338 U.S. 25, the case Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, overruled.
127. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-53.
128. See id. at 645-50.
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obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a state court." '129 Part IV concludes with the assurance that
"no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence."' t3 And the fifth and last
part of the opinion refers to "our holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part
of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"'' and observes that the constitu-
tional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures "is enforceable in the
same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process
Clause.' 13
2
In short, the majority opinion in Mapp reaffirms what I have called the "original
understanding" of the exclusionary rule, as explained in Weeks and its progency: The
rule is constitutionally required. Its survival does not depend on proof that it
significantly affects police conduct (although Justice Clark was convinced that it
does, as am I). Nor does its application to various fact situations turn on such proof.
However, ways of thinking about the exclusionary rule soon changed. In the
post-Warren Court era, the "deterrence" rationale and "cost-benefit" analysis gained
ascendancy. This approach bloomed in United States v. Calandra,'33 the most
important exclusionary rule case of the 1970s. The Calandra majority, per Justice
Powell, characterized the exclusionary rule--one might say disparaged it-as a
"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.' 3 4 Thus, whether the exclusionary rule should be applied "presents a
question, not of rights, but of remedies"--a question to be answered by weighing the
"likely 'costs"' of the rule against its "likely 'benefits."" 35
The post-Mapp way of thinking about the exclusionary rule enabled critics of
the rule to gain some important victories. This is hardly surprising. The "costs" of
the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent-the "freeing" of a "plainly guilty"
drug dealer' 36-- but the "benefits" of the rule are hard to grasp. One could say that
the benefits "involve safeguarding a zone of dignity and privacy for every citizen,
controlling abuses of power [and] preserving checks and balances."'13 And one could
regard these goals as "pretty weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable ones."138 But
the Court has not done so. Instead, it has viewed the benefits of the rule "as abstract
129. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 657.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 660.
133. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (ruling that grand jury witnesses may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
the questions are based on the fruits of an unlawful search).
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id. at 354,348,349.
136. However, are the costs any different than those that would be exacted by any equally effective alternative
remedy? Doesn't a society whose police comply with the Fourth Amendment in thefirst place "pay the same price"
as the society whose law enforcement officials cannot use the evidence they obtained because they violated the Fourth
Amendment? Don't both societies convict fewer criminals?
137. StephenJ. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: IndividualRights andLaw Enforcement, 66 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 11, 19 (1988).
138. Id.
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[and] speculative."139
On the other hand, the Court has underscored what it thinks are the severe costs
of the rule. Thus, it has called the rule a "drastic measure,"1'' an "extreme
sanction," '' a rule that "exacts a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the
truth in a criminal case,"' 42 and one whose application is "contrary to the idea of
proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice."' 43
Given the Court's characterization of the "costs" and "benefits" to be balanced,
the outcome is quite predictable. Indeed, although cost-benefit analysis sounds
objective, even scientific, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in search and seizure
cases, at least, it simply gives back the values and assumptions the Court feeds into
it.
During the cost-benefit analysis era, the exclusionary rule lost numerous times,
e.g., in United States v. Calandra (declining to apply the rule in grand jury
proceedings)," Stone v. Powell (greatly limiting the circumstances under which
Fourth Amendment claims can be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings), 45
United States v. Janis (rule inapplicable in federal civil tax proceedings),' 46 and INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza (rule inapplicable in civil deportation proceedings). 47
The "cost-benefit" approach to the search and seizure exclusionary rule
culminated in United States v. Leon,"4 the case that adopted a so-called "good faith"
exception (actually a "reasonable mistake" exception) to the exclusionary rule.
According to the Leon majority, the "marginal or nonexistent benefits" produced by
the exclusionary rule when the police reasonably but mistakenly rely on a search
warrant that turns out to be invalid "cannot justify the costs of exclusion."' 49
The earlier cases utilizing the "cost-benefit" approach had assumed that the
exclusionary rule was fully applicable in a criminal prosecution against the direct
victim of a Fourth Amendment violation and had maintained that the rule need not
also be applied in certain "collateral" or "peripheral" settings because "no significant
additional increment of deterrence [was] deemed likely.' 50 But Leon, for the first
time, utilized cost-benefit analysis to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule in the
prosecution's case-in-chief against those whose rights have been violated.
In Leon, the officers relied on a search warrant. Is the "reasonable good faith"
exception limited to the warrant setting? Some language in Leon supports such a
limitation; other language indicates that Leon should apply whenever the police are
acting in objective good faith.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976).
141. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,926 (1984).
142. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,734 (1980).
143. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
144. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
145. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
146. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
147. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
148. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
149. Id. at 922.
150. WAYNER. LAFAVE, SEARCHANDSEI2IJRE ATREAnSEONTHEFOURTHAMENmET56 (3d ed. 1996).
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I must say that at the time Leon was decided, I did not believe it would be
limited to the warrant setting. For one thing, the Court, and individual Justices in
separate opinions, had voiced serious doubts "the extreme sanction of exclusion," as
the Court called it in Leon,'5' could "pay its way" in any setting, let alone one where
the Fourth Amendment violations were neither deliberate nor substantial. For another
thing, I found it hard to believe that after many years of talk about a "good faith" or
"reasonable mistake" exception to the exclusionary rule, the Court would finally
adopt such an exception only to limit it to the tiny percentage of police searches
conducted pursuant to warrants.
The Rehnquist Court is yet to say that the same cost-benefit analysis that led to
the result in Leon supports a "good faith" exception across the board. But the
Rehnquist Court has extended Leon to other fact situations.
Thus it has upheld the admissibility of evidence (1) where the police act in
reasonable reliance on a statute authorizing the search in question even though the
statute turns out to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment55' and (2) where the
police make an invalid arrest, but one attributable to negligent record keeping by a
court clerk. 153
As illustrated by the very recent case of Pennsylvania Board of Probation v.
Scott,5 4 the Rehnquist Court has also continued to decline to apply the exclusionary
rule to proceedings other than criminal prosecutions. But the reasoning of the Court
leaves a good deal to be desired.
In Scott, the officers who conducted the warrantless and apparently
suspicionless search of Scott's home because they thought he might be keeping
firearms there, a violation of one of the conditions of his parole as well as a crime,
knew that Scott was a parolee. They themselves were parole officers. If Scott did
turn out to possess firearms (and he did), the officers probably contemplated a
revocation proceeding rather than a criminal prosecution. For, as the Supreme Court
observed a quarter-century ago, 155 a parole revocation "is often preferred to a new
prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the
basis of a lesser showing by the State."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between situations
like Scott and cases where the searching officers are unaware of the suspect's status
as a parolee. In the latter situation, the Pennsylvania Court saw no reason to apply
the exclusionary rule in a parolerevocation hearing because the officers probably had
a criminal prosecution in mind and knew that the exclusionary rule applied in such
a proceedings. Thus, reasoned the state court, in such a situation applying the
exclusionary rule in a revocation proceeding is unlikely to act as a significant
additional deterrent to illegal government behavior. 56
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
152. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
153. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
154. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
155. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,479 (1972).
156. See Scott v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Paraole, 698 A.2d 32, 38 (Pa. 1997).
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However, maintained the state court, "a different balance exists" when the
officer knows or has reason to believe that the suspect is a probationer or parolee.
In this situation, because the officer probably only has a revocation hearing in mind,
there is a need to apply the exclusionary rule in the revocation proceeding.
Otherwise, there will often be nothing else to deter the officer from conducting an
illegal search.
157
I happen to think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was right. But I don't
have any votes. Justice Clarence Thomas does. On this occasion he had five-five
who disagreed with the state court.
The Scott majority begged the question, I venture to say, by claiming that
application of the exclusionary rule in the revocation hearing would only provide
"marginal deterrence." '58 As Justice Souter pointed out for the dissenters, when the
searching officers know that the subject of their search is a parolee (or probationer),
there is nothing "marginal" or "incremental" about application of the exclusionary
rule. For the officers probably assume that the revocation hearing will be the only
proceeding in which the evidence will be offered.'59
According to the Scott majority, the relationship of parole officers to their
parolees is "more supervisory than adversarial" and "the failure of the parolee is in
a sense a failure for his supervising officer."'" (At this point, I guess, we are
supposed to picture parole officers who look like Pat O'Brien or Barry Fitzgerald.)
This relationship, continued the majority, means that "the harsh deterrent of exclusion
is unwarranted, given such other deterrents as departmental training and discipline
and the threat of damage actions."''
As the dissenters responded, however, while parole officers sometimes serve as
counselors for parolees, they "often serve as both prosecutors and law enforcement
officials" in their relationships with them. 162 As for "departmental training and
discipline" being a sufficient deterrent, observed the dissenters, the very same thing
could be said about the police generally-but that argument was rejected in Mapp v.
Ohio (as it had been three decades earlier in the Weeks'63 case).
Moreover, added the dissenters, the majority did not refer to any specific
departmental training regulation. Nor did it cite a single instance of discipline
imposed on a Pennsylvania parole officer for conducting an illegal search of a
parolee's home. Nor did it mention a single lawsuit brought by a parolee for an
illegal search.
The Scott decision is hardly surprising-given the many uncomplimentary
things the Court had said about the exclusionary rule in the 1970s and '80s-most
of which Justice Thomas repeated in his majority opinion. Scott may be viewed as
157. See id.
158. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 18 S. Ct. 2014,2022 (1998).
159. See id. at 2025 (Souter, J., with whom Ginsberg & Breyer, JJ., join dissenting.).
160. Id. at 2022.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2025.
163. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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another case in a long list of cases declining to apply the exclusionary rule to
proceedings other than criminal prosecutions. The only thing really surprising about
Scott is that as many as four Justices dissented. Justice Stevens reiterated his view
that the Fourth Amendment required the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.' 6
And, in a separate dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
challenged the way the majority had worked out its cost-benefit analysis.
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule in the revocation hearings,
maintained Souter, are surely no greater than the costs of applying the rule in a
criminal prosecution." Nor are the benefits any less. For in a case like Scott a
parole revocation hearing usually takes the place of a criminal trial, making it the
only proceeding in which illegally obtained evidence will be used against a parolee.'66
B. Taking a Grudging View of What Constitutes a Search or Seizure
Police practices need not be based on individualized suspicion or conducted
pursuant to search warrants-indeed, they are not covered by the Fourth Amendment
at all if they do not constitute "searches" or "seizures" within the meaning of the
Amendment. Thus, another way to diminish the protection against unreasonable
search and seizure--and a way the post-Warren Court has made considerable use
of-is to take a narrow, stingy view of what amounts to a "search" or "seizure."1
The Burger Court took a grudging view of the key terms "searches" and
"seizures" in a number of cases. Recall, for example, United States v. Miller
(because bank depositor "takes the risk" that information revealed to the bank will be
conveyed to the government, transfer of information to the government is not a
"search" or "seizure"), 167 Smith v. Maryland (because one who uses the phone
"assumes the risk" the phone company will tell the government the number she dialed,
the government's use of a pen register, a device that records all numbers dialed from
a given phone and the time they were dialed, is not a "search" or "seizure"), " Oliver
v. United States (although one takes sufficient precautions to render entry on his
private land, situated beyond the curtilage, a criminal trespass under state law, police
entry on and examination of that land not a "search"),' 69 and California v. Ciraolo
(police aerial surveillance of fenced-in backyard not a "search;" evidently defendant
should have placed an opaque dome over his backyard). 7
The Rehnquist Court has continued the trend. A trash bag is a common
repository for personal effects and a search of such bags can reveal intimate details
about one's business dealings; political activities, associations and beliefs;
consumption of alcohol; sexual practices, health and personal hygiene. Nevertheless,
164. See Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
165. See id. at 2026-27.
166. See id. at 2025,2027.
167. 425 U.S. 435,443 (1976).
168. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
169. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
170. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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the Rehnquist Court held that the police may tear open the sealed opaque trash bags
one leaves at the curb for garbage pick-up and examine their contents for evidence
of crime without engaging in a "search.',
171
The police had some information that Mr. Greenwood might have been engaged
in drug trafficking. But the way the opinion is written, this does not matter. The
Court would have reached the same result if the police had no reason whatever to
believe that Mr. Greenwood was violating the drug laws.
This is what it means to say, as the Greenwood Court did, that the examination
of a person's sealed garbage is not a "search" or a "seizure" and thus not restricted
in any way by the Fourth Amendment.
To say that the use of a police investigatory technique, e.g., police aerial
surveillance, police use of a pen register, or police examination of one's garbage, is
not a "search," is a drastic move. For it means the police investigatory technique is
completely uncontrolled by the Fourth Amendment. However, to conclude that a
particular investigatory technique is a "search" is not a drastic move. For such a
conclusion does not ban the investigative technique at issue altogether.
The expectation of privacy with respect to one's trash is considerably less
intense and consistent than the expectation of privacy or to one's home. Thus, one
could classify the examination of the contents of sealed trash bags as a "search," yet
plausibly conclude that it is not bounded by the same limitations applicable to a
search of one's dwelling. One might conclude, for example, that, although a
"search," police examination of sealed trash requires neither a search warrant nor
traditional probable cause.
Unfortunately, when deciding whether a particular police investigative practice
is a "search" or "seizure" the Rehnquist Court (as well as its immediate predecessor)
has failed to heed the advice of our two greatest commentators on the law of search
and seizure, Professors Anthony Amsterdam and WayneLaFave. According to them,
the fundamental inquiry in a case such as Greenwood ought to be whether, if the
particular police investigative practice at issue is allowed to go "unregulated by
constitutional restraints," our privacy "would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
with the aims of an open and free society."' 72
I, for one, think the answer to that question is yes. A society in which law
enforcement officials have carte blanche to rummage through people's trash for
evidence of crime, and inevitably come upon information pertaining to intimate
aspects of their personal lives, is a society whose privacy has been diminished to a
degree inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.
The Rehnquist Court has not only taken a cramped view of what constitutes a
"search," it has also given the crucial term "seizure" a narrow reading. In Florida
171. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). It is unclear to what extent the decision in Greenwood is
grounded on the notion that one has no legitimate expectation of privacy in materials one voluntarily turns over to a
third person or to what extent the decision turns on the fact that Mr. Greenwood left his garbage bags for collection on
the curb-outside the curtilage of his home.
172. Anthony AmsterdamPerspectives on the FourthAmendment,58 MiNN.L.REv.349,403 (1974), quoted with
approval in LAFAVE, supra note 107, at 393.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 34 Tulsa L.J. 491 1998-1999
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
v. Bostick,t73 the Court told us that if armed police board an interstate bus at a
scheduled intermediate stop, announce their mission is to detect drug traffickers,
randomly approach a passenger, ask to see his bus ticket and driver's license, and
then ask the passenger to let them search his luggage, no "seizure" has taken place.
Under these circumstances, with one or two husky officers towering over him and one
officer "in his face," we are supposed to believe that a reasonable person would feel
free to terminate the encounter or to ignore the police presence and continue to do
what he was doing- return to the crossword puzzle he was doing or just go to sleep.
Does anybody really believe this? I can think of a few, a very few, people who
might react this way-but I would not call any of them "reasonable persons."
C. Insulating Arbitrary Police Action
New York Times columnist William Safire may have exaggerated a bit, but not
by very much, when he maintained that "a strong reason must exist for commuters
to go into hock to buy a car, to sweat out traffic jams [and] to groan over repair bills"
and that that reason is "the blessed orneriness called privacy."' 4 Evidently the post-
Warren Supreme Court does not agree. For the privacy the Fourth Amendment
affords motorists diminished a good deal in the 1970s and '80s and it diminished still
further during the era of the Rehnquist Court.
First, some background. Two major exceptions to the search warrant
requirement arise in an automobile setting: (1) the search incident to a lawful arrest
and (2) the Carroll doctrine,"7 once called the "moving vehicle" exception.
In New York v. Belton,176 the Burger Court adopted a "bright line" rule that
greatly broadens the "search incident" exception; at least in automobile settings.
Belton holds that whether or not there is probable cause to believe a car contains
evidence of crime, so long as there are adequate grounds to make a lawful custodial
arrest of the car's occupants, even though the occupants are handcuffed and standing
outside the car, the police may conduct a warrantless search of the entire interior or
passenger compartment of the car. (This search includes closed containers found
within that zone.) Thus, warned Justice Stevens, an arresting officer may find reason
to take a minor traffic offender into custody "whenever he sees an interesting looking
briefcase or package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation.""
In a typical automobile search, the "search incident to arrest" exception and the
Carroll doctrine overlap. The two exceptions to the warrant clause are conceptually
173. 501 U.S.429 (1991).
174. Quoted in Lewis Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 557, 571 n.79 (1982). See also the discussion of how private automobile transportation has shaped
American society in David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 556,576-78 (1998).
175. The Carrolldoctrine gets its name from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
176. 453 U.S.454(1981).
177. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in Belton and
dissenting in the companion case of Robbins).
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distinct, however. As it was originally understood and for most of its life, the Carroll
doctrine permitted the police to search a car without the warrant only when there were
both (1) probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of crime and (2)
"exigent circumstances" making it impractical to obtain a warrant. However, the
Burger Court significantly expanded the doctrine by virtually eliminating the exigent
circumstances requirement.
Thus, in essence, the Carroll doctrine became simply a "probable cause"
exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles. Even cars that had been
removed to a police station could be subjected to warrantless searches. The Burger
Court implicitly recognized that it had extended, or transformed, the Carroll doctrine
by offering new rationales for the doctrine-once called the "moving vehicle
exception"--such as the lesser expectation of privacy in a car.
In the 1982 Ross case, 8 the Burger Court further extended the Carroll doctrine
utilizing it to sustain the warrantless search of a "moveable container" found in a
locked car trunk. The Burger Court drew a distinction between cases like Ross,
where the police had probable cause to search the entire vehicle for drugs, not just a
particular container inside the vehicle, and cases where the police had focused on a
particular package or suitcase even before it was placed in the vehicle and whose
presence in the car was merely coincidental or purely fortuitous.1 9 The police could
dispense with a search warrant in the former case-that was an "automobile search"
case-but not in the latter-that was only a "suitcase search" case.
Dissenting in Ross, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, protested that
even though the police encounter a closed container when they have probable cause
to search the entire vehicle, that closed container is no less private than the container
the police came upon when they are specifically searching for it-when probable
cause is focused exclusively on it and not on the vehicle generally.' 80 A closed
container, the Ross dissenters said in effect, is a closed container is a closed
container; therefore, whether the police have probable cause to search the entire
vehicle or probable cause to search a specific container only, they should have to
obtain a warrant to search the container in either case.
A decade later, in the Acevedo 8' case, the Rehnquist Court agreed with much
of the Ross dissenters' reasoning-but not their conclusion. The Acevedo Court
agreed that a closed container is a container is a container. Therefore what?
Therefore, concluded Acevedo, whether the probable cause has focused exclusively
on a particular container that just happens to be in a vehicle or whether the police
have probable cause to search the entire vehicle and come upon the container, the
police should not have to bother with a warrant in either case. 2
Acevedo may be read as a case which simply tidied up, or sought to tidy up, the
law governing searches of closed containers in vehicles. I think this would be an
178. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
179. See id. at 809-25. See also the discussion of Ross in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570-75 (1991).
180. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 839-42.
181. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
182. See id. at 579-80.
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unduly narrow reading of the case.
If theAcevedo Court eliminated one anomaly (the different Fourth Amendment
treatment of closed containers in a vehicle), it preserved another-the different Fourth
Amendment treatment of closed containers depending on whether they are inside or
outside vehicles. That suitcases, briefcases and other closed containers should
receive the protection of the warrant requirement when found outside an automobile,
but lose that protection when placed inside seems bizarre. Surely a person
demonstrates a stronger expectation of privacy (at least one unfamiliar with the
Carroll doctrine) when he locks a suitcase or briefcase in the trunk of his car than
when he does not.
I fear that someday the reasoning of Acevedo will apply (or extend) to closed
containers outside a vehicle. Indeed, in Acevedo, Justice Scalia concurred in the
result on the ground that a "probable cause" search of a closed container anywhere,
so long as it is "outside a privately owned building," is "not one of those searches
whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends upon a warrant."' 3 It would not
be the first time that a Scalia concurring opinion presaged a major development in
criminal procedure.
Three years ago, when the Rehnquist Court handed down its decision in Whren
v. United States,'84 one's privacy in one's car diminished further. In Whren a
surprisingly unanimous Court, per Justice Scalia, held that a traffic stop or arrest is
permissible so long as an officer in the same circumstances could have made the stop
or arrest (because the officer had observed a traffic violation) regardless of whether
a reasonable officer would have made the stop or arrest had there not been some
reason or motivation beyond the traffic offense (such as a hunch that the driver had
drugs or guns in his possession).
The defendants in Whren did not deny that they had violated certain provisions
of the local traffic code. But they argued that, given the great multitude of traffic and
vehicular equipment regulations and the ease with which the police may find anybody
violating one or more of them, allowing mere observation of a minor traffic offense
automatically to justify a stop or arrest gives the police the kind of arbitrary power
that the Fourth Amendment is supposed to prohibit.
Since the use of vehicles is so heavily and minutely regulated, total compliance
is virtually impossible.'85 This situation, maintained the defense, creates the great
temptation to use traffic enforcement as a means of investigating other, more serious,
violations, as to which no individualized suspicion exists. Probable cause as to a
183. Id. at 584-85.
184. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
185. As Professor David A. Harris has observed, supra note 174, at 559-60:
["Moving violations"] only begin the catalog of possible offenses. There are traffic infractions for
almost every conceivable aspect of vehicle operation, from the distance drivers must signal before
turning, to the times of day and weather conditions that require drivers to turn on their lights.
Some of these offenses are not even clearly defined, giving officers the discretion to stop drivers
who are operating vehicles in ways and under conditions that are not "reasonable and prudent."
And if regulation of driving is pervasive, legal requirements concerning vehicle equipment may
be even more so.
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minor traffic violation can be so easily come by that its existence provides no
effective protection against arbitrary police action.
Moreover, there is reason to think that the police use the pretext of traffic
enforcement to harass motorists because of the length of their hair, the style of their
clothing, or the color of their skin."8 6
In one recent case, United States v. Roberson,"8 7 the defense's contention that
the traffic stop was a mere pretext to search for drugs was supported by this
particular trooper's remarkable record-in the past five years he had arrested 250
people on drug charges--all after traffic stops or arrests. (How many motorists were
stopped and induced to consent to searches of their cars in order to produce that
remarkable record? And who were the people stopped?)
I think the Whren Court should have adopted the "would have" test, under
which a traffic stop or arrest satisfies the Fourth Amendment only if a reasonable
police officer would have been motivated to stop the car or arrest the motorist by a
desire to enforce the traffic laws or-to put it another way-police action violates the
Fourth Amendment if a reasonable officer would not have taken the action she did,
but for an underlying purpose or motivation that, standing alone, could not provide
a lawful basis for the police action.
Applying this test to the facts of the Whren case would have been easy. The
arresting officers wereplainclothes vice squad officers in unmarked cars, patrolling
what they call a "high drug area" of Washington, D.C. 8 ' District of Columbia police
regulations permit plainclothes officers in unmarked cars to enforce traffic laws only
when the violation is "so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of
others"' -- and that is a far cry from the minor violations that occurred in Whren.
But the Court rejected this approach. It held that a traffic stop supported by
adequate grounds to believe that a violation occurred satisfies the Fourth Amendment
whatever the motives of the police, whatever internal police regulations may have to
say about enforcing the traffic laws and whatever the usual or routine practice of the
police department. In short, Whren tells us that there is no such thing as a pretext
traffic stop.
A year after Whren, the Rehnquist Court handed down two more decisions that
expand police powers when dealing with motorists and car passengers: Ohio v.
Robinette1'9 and Maryland v. Wilson.'
9
'
The Robinette case featured Deputy Sheriff Newsome. He testified that it was
186. See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMw L. RE V. 425 (1997); David A. Harris,
"Driving While Black" andAll Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and PretextualTraffic Stops, 87 J.QCUa
L. &CRuNLOX 544 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 Sup. CL Rev. 271; see also RAmA.LLKaTERAcECIMEArDumLAw 137,158-60 (1997);
Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"--Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures:
Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL- U.L. REv. 243 (1991); Sherri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a
Suspect, 93 YALELJ. 214 (1983).
187. 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993).
188. Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
189. Id. at 815.
190. 519 U.S.33 (1996).
191. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
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his routine practice to ask permission to search a motorist's car during a traffic stop.
When asked in another case why, he replied: "I need the practice."' 2 He had a lot of
practice. In one year alone he requested, and obtained consent to, a search incident
to a traffic stop more than 750 times. 93
TheRobinette case arose as follows: After stopping the defendant for speeding
in a construction zone, issuing a verbal warning, and returning his license, Deputy
Newsome added: "One question before you get gone. Are you carrying any illegal
contraband in your car? Any weapon of any kind, drugs, anything like that?"'
194
When the defendant replied in the negative, the deputy asked whether he could
search the car. The defendant consented. The search turned up a small amount of
drugs. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the evidence should have been excluded
because the defendant's consent to the search was obtained during an illegal detention
(after every aspect of the traffic stop had been brought to a conclusion) and the drugs
found were a product of that unlawful detention. 95
The Ohio court ruled that unless the situation were clarified by the officer, most
motorists in Robinette's situation would believe when asked to consent to a search of
their cars that they were still validly in police custody. This being so, in order to
prevent the police from turning a routine traffic stop "into a fishing expedition for
unrelated criminal activity," and in order to assure that the encounter immediately
following the completion of the business relating to the traffic stop is truly
consensual, when the police have completed the business of the traffic stop, any
attempt to search a vehicle about an unrelated crime must be preceded by a police
warning: "At this time you are legally free to go" (or words to this effect). 19 6
The State of Ohio and the attorney generals of thirty-six other states warned the
U.S. Supreme Court that the prophylactic rule promulgated by the Ohio Supreme
Court would "hamstring efforts to ferret out illegal drug trafficking and use."' 97 The
U.S. Solicitor General's office, which filed an amicus brief on behalf of Ohio,
assured the Supreme Court that "a reasonable person in [Mr. Robinette's] situation
would have understood that he was free to leave."' 98
If this is so, I cannot help asking: If a motorist knows, or a reasonable person
in his shoes would know, that he is "free to leave," how or why is requiring the police
to tell him this-to tell him what he already knows (or what every reasonable person
in his shoes would know)-going to "hamstring efforts" to combat drug traffic? I
may be missing something, but it strikes me that warning a motorist in Robinette's
situation that he is "free to leave" would only have an adverse effect on law
enforcement if and when it informs a motorist who does not think he is free to leave
the scene that he is.
192. State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498,502 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
193. See id. at 503 n.3.
194. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35-36.
195. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (Ohio 1995).
196. Id. at 696, quoted in Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36.
197. BriefofAnicus Curiae States of Alabama, California, Colorado, at 8, Robinette (No. 95-891).
198. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 24, Robinette (No. 95-89 1).
[Vol. 34:465
HeinOnline  -- 34 Tulsa L.J. 496 1998-1999
CONFESSIONS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
To almost no one's surprise, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion, thought it would be "unrealistic" to
require police officers to tell motorists detained for traffic violations that they are
"free to go" before asking them whether they would consent to a search of their
cars.
199
Why would it be impractical? Keep in mind that Deputy Newsome, and many
other officers as well, routinely ask motorists who have been stopped for a traffic
violation and are about to leave whether they are carrying drugs or weapons and
(after receiving the usual negative answers) whether they will consent to a search of
their cars. This is sometimes called the "oh-by-the-way" routine. It is hard to see
why advising a once-detained motorist that he is free to leave is any more time-
consuming or any more burdensome than the technique Newsome and other officers
use in working their way up to asking a motorist to consent to a search.
In rejecting the position taken by the Ohio court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Court has consistently eschewed "bright-line rules."' In fact, however, the
post-Warren Court has promulgated a number of bright-line rules expanding police
power.
For example, New York v. Class2 1 permits an officer to reach into the passenger
compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring the Vehicle Identification
Number after its driver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has left the vehicle
even though there is no reason to think the driver has committed any offense other
than the traffic violation. New York v. Belton2°2 holds that even though there is no
basis for believing that a car contains contraband or any evidence of crime, so long
as there are adequate grounds for making a custodial arrest of the car's driver, the
police may conduct a warrantless search of the entire interior or passenger
compartment of the car, including closed containers found within that zone.
Moreover, Pennsylvania v. Mims 203 allows an officer to order a driver out of
a validly stopped vehicle absent any particularized suspicion that the driver is armed
or dangerous. Indeed, only a short three months after telling us that it had consis-
tently avoided bright-line rules in the search and seizure area, the Court adopted still
another bright-line rule in Maryland v. Wilson,204 holding that the aforementioned
Mimms rule applies to the passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle as well as to the
driver.
Taken together, Whren, Wilson and Robinette give the police a great deal of
discretionary power. If they follow him or her long enough, the police can stop
almost any driver for a traffic violation. Once stopped, drivers can be intimidated or
misled or "sweet talked" into consenting to searches of their cars. (Some experienced
officers report that they have never failed to get a motorist to consent to a search of
199. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40.
200. Id. at 39.
201. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
202. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
203. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
204. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
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his or her car.)
Robinette demonstrates that the Rehnquist Court seems unwilling or uninter-
ested in requiring the police to clarify the situation in which a person finds herself
when the police seek her consent to a search of her car. And Maryland v. Wilson
enables the police to order passengers out of the car as a matter of course.
As Professor David A. Harris has observed, as a result of Whren, Robinette,
and Wilson:
for all practical purposes, the venerable Fourth Amendment principle that the
police need a reason-call it probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or what-
ever-to interfere with a citizen in his or her daily activity has all but vanished for
anyone who drives or rides in a car. Traffic stops have become both the occasion
and the legal justification for a new kind of criminal investigation: one that
features suspicionless investigation on an individual level, without any special
governmental need beyond ordinary law enforcement.'
As already mentioned, surprisingly no Justice dissented in Whren. But Justice
Kennedy may be having second thoughts about the case. Dissenting in Wilson, he
pointed out:
The practical effect of our holding in Whren, of course, is to allow the police to
stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances. When Whren is coupled with
today's holding, the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary
control by the police. If the command to exit were to become commonplace, the
Constitution would be diminished in a most public way. 6
III. SOME FJNAL THOUGHTS
The reasoning used by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in the criminal
procedure cases outruns the results these Courts have reached to date. (But the
Rehnquist Court may yet achieve these results before its era ends.)
If, as the Court has repeatedly told us, a mere violation of Miranda is not a
violation of the Constitution, then didn't the Supreme Court go awry in the Miranda
case itself when it imposed the new confession doctrine on the states? For if a
confession obtained without giving a suspect theMiranda warnings does not infringe
on the self-incrimination clause unless it is accompanied by actual coercion, why are
the state courts not free to admit all confessions that are not the product of actual
coercion?
By disparaging the Miranda warnings, by viewing them as only "second-class"
prophylactic safeguards and Miranda violations as only "second-class" wrongs,
205. Harris, supra note 174, at 565.
206. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 423.
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language in various Burger Court cases2°7 seem to have prepared the way for the
overruling of Miranda itself- or at least prepared the way to uphold the constitution-
ality of § 3501, which purports to "repeal" Miranda. But the Rehnquist Court has
yet to take that next step. Instead it has reaffirmed, reinvigorated, and spoke
approvingly of the "bright-line prophylactic Edwards rule."2 '8
On the search and seizure front, too, the post-Warren Court has not been led by
the logic of its principles and assumptions to a conclusion one might have expected.
If, as the Court told us a decade and a half ago in Leon, any rule that excludes
reliable evidence must "pay its way" by deterring official lawlessness, 209 and if, as it
also told us more than two decades ago, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule
has never been established,210 then why stop with a "good faith" modification of the
exclusionary rule? Why not abolish the rule altogether?
One reason, ironically, is that a "shrunken" Fourth Amendment and a narrower
exclusionary rule has made the rule a good deal more livable and defensible. After
thirty years of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the scope of the Fourth Amendment
and its exclusionary rule have been so down-sized, the need to act pursuant to a
search warrant so reduced, the probable cause standard so softened, and the
occasions on which the police may act on the basis of "reasonable suspicion," or no
individualized suspicion at all, so increased that nowadays if the criminal goes free
it is because the constable has flouted the Fourth Amendment, not because he has
made an honest blunder.2 '
This may well be the price we have had to pay for the exclusionary rule. I think
it is the price we would have had to pay for an effective tort remedy or any other
Fourth Amendment remedy that actually worked. But that price has been paid.
When we talk about the Rehnquist Court, we are talking about a moving target.
The Rehnquist Court era might extend another five or ten years. Depending upon the
mood of the country and the views of future Justices, the Rehnquist Court may yet
carry the post-Warren Court's characterization of Miranda and the search and
seizure exclusionary rule to "the limits of its logic. 2 12 Then again, it may not.
Whether or not the Rehnquist Court does sustain Congress's 1968 "repeal" of
Miranda or does expand the so-called "good faith" exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule--or ultimately abolishes the exclusionary rule
altogether-may well tell us more about the Rehnquist Court and criminal justice
than any ruling this Court has handed down to date.
Much remains to be seen. At present, I think there are four Supreme Court
Justices who are fairly sensitive to the rights of those accused or suspected of crime:
207. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
208. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,682 (1998); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
209. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,907 n.6 (1984).
210. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,449-53,450 n.22 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,492 & n.32
(1976).
211. Cf. Judge (laterJustice) Cardozo's oft-quoted criticism of the exclusionary rule in People v. Defore, 150 NE.
585,587(1926): "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."
212. See the observation of Justice Holmes in Hudson County Water Co.v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,355 (1908).
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Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. Sometimes this foursome will be joined by
Justice O'Connor or Justice Kennedy. On rare occasions, such as Chandler v.
Miller,2 3 this foursome will be joined by everybody except Chief Justice Rehnquist.
A good deal may turn on whether this foursome grows or shrinks-on whether a new
Justice replaces say, Scalia or say, Stevens-and on who makes the appointment.
In short, we will not be able to evaluate fully "The Rehnquist Court and
Criminal Justice" until the Rehnquist Court era comes to an end. And we may not
be able to do it even then. A complete evaluation may have to await a quarter-
century retrospective--just as, in this very law journal, I did a quarter-century
retrospective on "The Warren Court and Criminal Justice" four years ago."14
However, if the University of Tulsa College of Law does hold a conference at
which it invites someone to present a paper on a quarter-century retrospective on
"The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Justice," I'm afraid it will have to ask someone
else.
213. 520 U.S. 305(1997). In Chandler, an 8-1 majority, per Ginsberg, J., struck down a Georgia statute requiring
candidates for various state offices (e.g., governor, attorney general, appellate judges, district attorneys and state
legislators) to certify that they had tested negative for drug use within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or
election. The state had relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's three prior drug-testing cases, all of which had upheld the
challenged drug-testing programs. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(sustaining drug tests for U.S. Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (sustaining drug and alcohol tests for railroad employees
involved in train accidents or who violate certain safety rules); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(upholding random drug testing of public school student athletes). These cases, especially Von Raab, can plausibly be
read quite broadly or quite narrowly (limiting them to their special facts). In Chandler, the Court read its drug-testing
precedents quite narrowly.
The state's primary argument in Chandler was that unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high office:
drug use undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials, calls into question their judgment and integrity,
and jeopardizes antidrug law enforcement efforts andother public functions. The Georgia statute, maintained the state,
deters unlawful drug users from becoming candidates and thus stops them from attaining high state office.
It is possible to read Von Raab broadly as supporting the state's argument in Chandler-as standing for the
proposition that warrantless and suspicionless drug testing may be based on the government's need to maintain the
"integrity" and "public image" of its employees. But the Chandler Court emphatically rejected this rationale for
random drug testing, 520 U.S. at 318,321-22:
Our precedents establish that the proffered special need for drug testing must be
substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized
suspicion. Georgia has failed to show.., a special need of that kind.
.... Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the state's elected officials,
these officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the required
certification immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need revealed, in short, is "symbolic,"
not "special," as that term draws meaning from our case law.
.... Howeverwell meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised diminishes personal
privacy for a symbol's sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state action.
214. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA
LJ. 1 (1995).
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